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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3875 
___________ 
 
JASON B. TIFFIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
USP – LEWISBURG WARDEN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 13-cv-00851) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 17, 2014 
 
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 31, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jason Tiffin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for 
 [Type here] 
 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 In November 2005, Tiffin was arrested in the State of Washington after police 
pursued a car in which he was a passenger and found him wearing body armor and 
possessing shot gun shells.  While released on bond, Tiffin was found in possession of a 
firearm.  He was taken into custody and convicted in state court of bail jumping.  In 2007, 
Tiffin was convicted in federal court on charges of felon in possession of a firearm, felon 
in possession of ammunition, and felon in possession of body armor arising from the 
November 2005 incident.  He was sentenced to ten years in prison.  That same year, 
Tiffin was released from state custody to serve his federal sentence.   
 In 2013, Tiffin filed a complaint in District Court seeking relief pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Tiffin challenged the computation of his sentence.  He claimed that 
his state and federal sentences should run concurrently, or that the state prison in which 
he was confined should be designated for service of his federal sentence, as discussed in 
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1990).  Tiffin also sought credit for time 
served at a Federal Detention Center.  In response, the Government argued that the 
District Court should dismiss Tiffin’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies or deny relief because his sentence has been calculated properly. 
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 The Magistrate Judge treated Tiffin’s filing as a § 2241 habeas petition and 
concluded that he had failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.  The 
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and dismissed Tiffin’s habeas 
petition.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of 
the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual 
findings.  Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). 
 Tiffin’s claims are cognizable under § 2241.  Barden, 921 F.2d at 478.  Federal 
prisoners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a § 2241 
habeas petition.  Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al., 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 
1996).  A failure to satisfy the procedural rules of the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative 
process constitutes a procedural default.  Id.  If such a default renders the administrative 
process unavailable, review of a habeas claim is barred absent a showing of cause and 
prejudice.  Id. at 761.  
 The record reflects that the Bureau of Prisons has a three-step administrative 
remedy procedure that applies after an unsuccessful informal attempt at resolving a 
complaint.  An inmate must submit an administrative remedy form to the prison Warden.  
If the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response, he may appeal to the Regional 
Director.  The inmate may then appeal to the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons.  
Each step must be completed within a prescribed time.  See Resp. to Habeas Pet. at Ex. 1.   
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 Tiffin submitted an administrative remedy request seeking credit towards his 
federal sentence for time served in state and federal custody.  The Warden denied the 
request because the credit Tiffin sought is barred by statute.  The Warden, however, 
noted that Tiffin’s request had been forwarded to the Designation and Sentence 
Computation Center (“DSCC”) to consider whether the state prison in which he served 
his sentence should be designated for service of his federal sentence.  See Barden, 921 
F.2d at 484 (holding prisoner was entitled to such review). 
 Tiffin appealed to the Regional Director, who responded that his file was 
forwarded to the DSCC, that the results were still pending, and that he would be notified 
when a determination had been made.  Tiffin appealed to the Central Office of the Bureau 
of Prisons, but on December 3, 2012, his appeal was rejected for failure to include a copy 
of his institution administrative remedy request.  Tiffin was afforded 15 days to resubmit 
the appeal in proper form.  Tiffin did not do so.  Instead, he filed his habeas petition in 
District Court.     
 As recognized by the District Court, Tiffin did not complete his final level appeal 
and thus did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies.  The 15-day period to 
resubmit his appeal has long passed.  Under Moscato, his failure to satisfy the Bureau of 
Prison’s rules constitutes a procedural default, at least with respect to any claim that was 
not forwarded to the DSCC for review.1 
                                              
1The record does not include a decision by the DSCC on Tiffin’s claim.  The Government 
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 Tiffin has not established cause excusing his procedural default.  Tiffin argued 
below that he did everything he could but he was precluded from fully exhausting his  
remedies as a result of the prison staff’s failure to mail his documents.  Tiffin submitted  
documents reflecting that his second level appeal to the Regional Office was initially not  
received.  Tiffin’s Unit Manager, however, rectified the problem by asking that Tiffin be 
allowed to proceed outside the applicable time frames and verifying that Tiffin gave staff 
his appeal for mailing.  Tiffin’s appeal to the Regional Office was considered.  These  
circumstances do not establish cause excusing the procedural default, which occurred at 
the final level of review, not when Tiffin appealed to the Regional Office. 
 Tiffin further argued in District Court that his final level appeal “never made it,” 
that a Unit Manager at USP-Coleman was supposed to “give [him] a memo to refile,” and 
that he “fought for weeks and weeks to get this.”  Traverse at 1.  Tiffin stated that he was 
then transferred to USP-Lewisburg, that he was unable to get his counselor there to 
follow up with staff at USP-Coleman, and that, as a result, he filed his complaint in 
District Court.   
 To the extent Tiffin contends that the Bureau of Prisons Central Office did not 
receive his final level appeal, the record reflects that his appeal was received.  Tiffin has 
                                                                                                                                                  
submitted the declaration of a DSCC employee providing that this is not a case where 
designation of concurrent service is warranted, but the status of the DSCC’s review is not 
clear.  Tiffin also does not contend that he exhausted his remedies through review by the 
DSCC.  His claim under Barden was thus properly dismissed for failure to exhaust, 
although the record does not reflect that he procedurally defaulted this claim.   
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not squarely addressed the evidence submitted by the Government showing that his final 
level appeal was rejected for failure to include documents, other than stating that the 
evidence is a lie.  See Motion for Reconsideration at 1.  Tiffin appears to fault the prison 
for “blocking” him by failing to give him certain documents, but his assertions are not 
specific and he has not shown that his failure to resubmit his appeal might have been 
attributable to prison staff.  Tiffin also argues on appeal that he “never heard back” after 
he submitted his final level appeal, see Informal Brief at 2-3, but he appears to assert the 
same with respect to his appeal to the Regional Office, and that assertion is belied by the 
record.  In short, Tiffin’s filings are insufficient to establish cause for his procedural 
default. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
